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Executive Summary
This report from the study, Strengthening Missouri’s
Capacity to Respond to Public Health Crises, summarizes key findings that are relevant to strengthening
the state’s and local public health agencies’ (LPHAs)
capacity to respond to future public health crises. With
funding from Missouri Foundation for Health, a George
Washington University study team conducted 138 stakeholder interviews within public health and other sectors
involved in the COVID-19 response, revealing several key
opportunities for the Missouri Department of Health and
Senior Services (DHSS). Missouri, like many other states,
faced great challenges in responding to the COVID-19
pandemic. Missouri now has a singular opportunity to
build stronger public health agencies at state and local
levels with unprecedented amounts of funding from
the federal government. Among the key findings and
recommendations are:
Ability to collect and analyze data associated with
an infectious disease outbreak was severely lacking.
• The sufficiency and accuracy of state data was

called into question on many occasions.
• LPHAs had limited capacity and resources to

undertake and sustain surveillance activities and
contact tracing.
• The rollout of testing was delayed and the state’s

testing protocols were confusing for LPHAs. Many
LPHAs did not have the capacity or staffing to
manage the level of testing needed.
• LPHAs were challenged with tracking vaccine dis-

tribution from the state and resorted to local and
regional “bartering systems” for redistribution.
Past emergency response experience and planning
were not fully leveraged during the pandemic.
• There is tremendous variation in training, skills, and

capacity across LPHAs, with many lacking the fundamental infrastructure and expertise to mount an
effective emergency response.
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• Coordination between emergency response offi-

cials and public health officials was often lacking
or disjointed. Informal channels of communication
were often used to compensate.
• The state uses a Highway Patrol map to define the

health regions of the state. This does not align with
public health or health care infrastructure, nor does
it reflect the population, and was therefore not
useful for pandemic response and coordination.
• The health care sector (primarily hospitals and com-

munity health centers) took on significant public
health functions, ranging from standing up testing
programs and doing limited contact tracing to
organizing vaccine clinics and redistribution.
• LPHAs reported difficulties surging their workforce

to respond to the pandemic.
The state’s commitment to financing public health is
among the lowest in the country.
• Historically, Missouri has depended dispropor-

tionately on federal funds to support public health
functions. Those funds are often categorical in
nature, i.e., tied to specific programs or services,
thus limiting the state’s (and LPHAs’) ability to
establish a public health workforce that can adequately carry out core public health functions or be
responsive to emergent needs.
• Federal pass-through dollars for pandemic response,

such as CARES Act funding meant to support LPHAs,
was sent to county officials, rather than directly
to LPHAs. In a number of key instances, funds for
pandemic response never reached LPHAs, which
undermined their ability to respond.
Consistent guidance regarding public health mitigation measures against COVID-19 was lacking from
the state, and complex local governance structures
resulted in inconsistent guidance and policy at the
local level.

• LPHAs were left without guidance on many issues,

such as masking and school attendance, leading to
different practices among neighboring municipalities and counties; LPHAs did not see the state as a
resource for resolving these differences.

get on-the-ground expertise and assess potential
implementation challenges.
• The variable legal authority and governance struc-

tures of LPHAs further contributed to confusion
around the pandemic response.

• The state did not consult with LPHAs on pandemic

response decisions, thus missing an opportunity to

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE
IN MISSOURI
Recommendation:

The State of Missouri Should:

1

Provide financial support
and technical assistance for
public health accreditation.

Create a special fund to provide technical assistance for LPHAs to assess readiness
for accreditation via the Public Health Accreditation Board, identify costs to close
gaps, and cover fees associated with the accreditation application process.

2

Prioritize equity.

Expand funding, staff, and other supports to help LPHAs integrate equity
principles into data collection and reporting and community engagement (i.e.,
trust building, links to social services). Increase workforce and funding for the
Office of Minority Health.

3

Build a modernized
surveillance system.

Build a modernized system and provide LPHAs or regional bodies with hardware
and software to manage the system, consistent with federal standards.

4

Create regional
coordinating bodies.

Incentivize and support greater formal sharing of staffing and services
among smaller LPHAs, with a lead public health agency designated to convene
and coordinate, designed to develop and strengthen all foundational public
health capabilities.

5

Bolster the public
health workforce.

Support workforce development through equitable recruiting, hiring, and
promotion practices; new training programs; enhanced salaries for LPHA leaders
with advanced training; and deploy skilled staff within regions.

6

Ensure equitable
public health funding
across the state.

Provide a minimum level of funding for LPHAs, linked to delivery of foundational
public health services and an equity analysis incorporating social vulnerability, and
ensure that public health money flows directly to LPHAs.

7

Clarify LPHA governance
structure and authorities.

Commission legal analysis to create greater consistency in decision making and
oversight across LPHA governance and financing.

8

Harmonize policy
development.

Ensure consistent policies across jurisdictions for public health prevention
and mitigation measures. DHSS should establish and adhere to protocols for
consultation with LPHAs on new policies during emergencies.

https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_policy_briefs/61/
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Introduction and Overview
As of July 2021, COVID-19 has tragically taken the lives
of more than 10,000 Missourians and upended the social
and economic fabric of all its residents. The pandemic
severely challenged public health in the state, highlighting the importance of a strong public health system at
all levels of government. Unlike any other public health
challenge or disaster in recent history, every part of the
state (and nation) was simultaneously engaged with
pandemic response, and thus resources could not be
diverted from other areas to help one region cope with
the crisis. COVID-19 tested public health infrastructure
and systems in profound ways and serves as a strong
reminder of what pandemic preparedness — a focus for
public health since the early 2000s — is all about.
In the summer of 2020, the George Washington (GW)
University was contracted by Missouri Foundation for
Health to assess Missouri’s public health preparedness
and response capacities to the COVID-19 pandemic
and future public health crises. We used a state- and
local-level case study approach, examining the pandemic
response statewide, and in three diverse geographic
areas — the Northeast, Southwest, and St. Louis regions.1
This interim report summarizes key findings from GW’s
research, including 138 interviews with stakeholders in
public health and many other fields that are relevant to
strengthening the state’s capacity to respond to future
public health threats, and by extension, the capacity
of Local Public Health Agencies (LPHAs).2 Subsequent

reports will provide more granular findings on region-specific responses to COVID-19 and opportunities for LPHAs
and regional partners.
In April 2021, the National Academy of Medicine published the “Public Health COVID-19 Impact Assessment:
Lessons Learned and Compelling Needs” report,3 that
found common deficiencies across the country, many
of which can be remedied by policy, structural, and
budgetary changes at the state level. A more concerted
effort at building community partnerships is also essential
to regaining the trust of the public. A recent national
survey showed reduced confidence in state and local
health departments, often seen along partisan lines.4 Our
research in Missouri does not contradict these national
findings. Local leaders across the state — whether in
public health or health care, or in any of the other sectors dependent on a strong public health voice and
system — have expressed concern about this loss of trust,
which is central to successfully responding to ongoing
health problems and emergencies.
The state now has a singular opportunity to build stronger
public health agencies at the state and local levels with
unprecedented amounts of funding from the federal
government.5,6 As of July 2021, Missouri had already
received $921 million in federal funding from the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention for COVID response.
Some of that funding was used to surge critical resources

1 Methods and Data Sources can be found in Appendix A
2 For explanation of the role of the 115 local public health agencies in Missouri’s public health system, see https://health.mo.gov/
living/lpha/.
3 DeSalvo, K., B. Hughes, M. Bassett, G. Benjamin, M. Fraser, S. Galea, N. Garcia, and J. Howard. (2021, Apr 7). Public Health
COVID-19 Impact Assessment: Lessons Learned and Compelling Needs. NAM Perspectives. Discussion Paper, National Academy
of Medicine, Washington, DC. https://doi.org/10.31478/202104c
4 The Public’s Perspective on the United States Public Health System. (2021, May 13). Robert Wood Johnson Foundation/Harvard
School of Public Health. https://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/2021/05/the-publics-perspective-on-the-united-states-publichealth-system.html
5 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. CDC COVID-19 State, Tribal, Local, and Territorial Funding. (2021, July 9).
https://www.cdc.gov/budget/fact-sheets/covid-19/funding/index.html
6 U.S. Department of the Treasury. Coronavirus State and Local Fiscal Funds. (2021, July 9). https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/
coronavirus/assistance-for-state-local-and-tribal-governments/state-and-local-fiscal-recovery-funds
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in response to the pandemic, but significant portions can
also be leveraged for modernization activities. Additional
federal fiscal relief funding from the U.S. Department
of the Treasury can also be used for public health modernization. This report delineates opportunities for use
of these funds, grounded in the evidence the GW team
systematically collected and analyzed for the project.

Using the HealthierMO7 framework8 as a guide, this
interim report is organized in three parts: (1) preliminary
assessment of state and local foundational public health
capabilities; (2) implications of the state’s governance
and funding structure for public health; and (3) state
recommendations for strengthening the public health
infrastructure in Missouri.

MISSOURI’S FOUNDATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES MODEL,
#HEALTHIERMO

The state now has a
singular opportunity to
build stronger public
health agencies at the
state and local levels
with unprecedented
amounts of funding from
the federal government

7 HealthierMO is an initiative of the Missouri Public Health Association with support from Missouri Foundation for Health and other
funders that convenes public health agencies and partners to build “a stronger, more resilient public health system.” For more
information about HealthierMO, see https://www.healthiermo.org/
8 According to HealthierMO, Missouri’s Foundational Public Health Services Model “defines a minimum set of fundamental public
health services and capabilities that must be available in every community in order to have a functional health system.” For an explanation of the model and the foundational capabilities it outlines, see https://82e4c309-d318-40ba-b895-4b0debd596f5.filesusr.
com/ugd/9bd019_00975db1060b4cb9bceacc4062ee53c8.pdf
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I. Preliminary Assessment of
State and Local Foundational
Public Health Capabilities
The National Academy of Medicine publication referenced above used the foundational capabilities9 — the
underpinnings of a modernized and effective public
health department — as a lens through which to assess
state and local responses to the pandemic. Many of
these capabilities mirror the Foundational Public Health
Services model that HealthierMO has adopted, and for
that reason we are using the same framework, with one
addition: a focus on equity. Given the disparate impact
of the pandemic along racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic
lines, public health’s capability to mount an equitable
emergency response and build partnerships and programs to reduce underlying inequities in communities
is increasingly seen as foundational in and of itself.10
This section reviews our preliminary findings within each
category of the eight foundational capabilities.

Assessment and Surveillance
HealthierMO defines this capability as the “capacity to
collect, analyze, and utilize data to identify and address
health priorities.” This is one of the most fundamental
functions of public health. During the pandemic, this
capacity included conducting surveillance, outbreak
investigations, and COVID testing and tracing.

FINDINGS
• The ability to collect and analyze data associated

with an infectious disease outbreak was severely
lacking, and on many occasions the accuracy of
state data was called into question. The state
initially did not use a unified data system. LPHAs
relied upon various tracking and data systems,
some quite outdated and most not interoperable
across the health sector or with other LPHAs and
the state. These weaknesses affected both case
reporting and vaccination distribution systems.

• As a result, the state’s data was not timely and

was often incomplete, with no formal mechanisms for correcting data in the state’s database.
In addition, because new systems were created
urgently and impromptu, staff were diverted from
key work. The combined deficiency in state and
LPHA capacity was reflected by the need for the
state to use a contractor, Deloitte, for key surveillance functions that government staff normally
handle, including ongoing assessment of the
vaccine distribution effort. The state even relied
upon Deloitte for COVID outbreak investigations.

9 PHNCI. Foundational Public Health Services Fact Sheet (November 2018). https://phnci.org/uploads/resource-files/FPHS-Factsheet-November-2018.pdf
10 Indeed, federal legislation to support foundational public health capabilities adds equity to the list of foundational capabilities.
See https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/674/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22Public+Health+Infrastructure+Fund+Saves+Lives+Act%22%5D%7D&r=4&s=1
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• As noted in the equity discussion below, the

surveillance systems were not able to provide
sufficiently granular data regarding populations
most vulnerable during the pandemic.
• A broad group of stakeholders, including

those in public health, health care, professional
associations, community organizations, the
business community, and educational institutions, reported that problems with data accuracy,
availability, granularity, and timeliness hampered
efforts to respond effectively to the pandemic.
• LPHAs had limited capacity and resources to

sustain surveillance activities and contact tracing.
Many LPHAs do not have trained epidemiologists who could provide localized analyses of the
pandemic for local officials and the community (in
the Northeast, in at least one instance, access to
a regional epidemiologist was seen as an important resource). During the pandemic, the need for
contact tracing outstripped the ability of LPHAs to
conduct investigations in the traditional manner.

• While many LPHAs were creative in bringing on

volunteers or using internet-based approaches,
this diminished the ability of LPHAs to fully
understand and respond to a broad pandemic.
These approaches also resulted in frustration by
other community sectors that needed support
for contact tracing, managing quarantine and
isolation, and providing necessary social services.

The ability to collect and analyze
data associated with an infectious
disease outbreak was severely
lacking, and on many occasions the
accuracy of state data was called
into question.

• Although LPHAs used formal and informal chan-

nels to share experiences about their pandemic
response, the state did not leverage this knowledge to provide guidance on contact tracing or
identify best practices.
• The rollout of testing in the state was delayed

and confusing for LPHAs. Many LPHAs did not
have the capacity or staffing to manage the level of
testing needed. Hospitals and health centers often
stepped in, but their geographic and population
reach was not always as extensive or inclusive as
needed. This prevented early understanding of the
scope of the pandemic and delayed contact tracing that could have reduced the spread of infection.

• Early testing sites in the St. Louis region, which

had the first COVID deaths in the state, were
located in areas with limited testing access
for residents at highest risk of poor COVID
outcomes, leaving many minority residents distrustful of subsequent local or state public health
efforts. Similar sentiments also were voiced in
the Southwest region.
• Tracking vaccine distribution was a challenge,

especially in the early stages of the vaccine
rollout. LPHAs and the state were both blindsided
at times, not knowing full details about the vaccine
supply coming into the state directly to providers
and how best to plan for vaccine distribution. The
state did not receive information from the federal
government about direct distribution channels to
FQHCs and pharmacies, and LPHAs felt in the dark
about how the state was allocating vaccines at the
local level. In addition, tracking and communicating about vaccination deployment among LPHAs
and third-party vaccination events (e.g., National
Guard, FEMA, and hospitals and health centers)
remains a challenge.

• Despite an effort to control vaccine distribution

by the state, many LPHAs engaged in barter systems with each other and the health care system
to ensure they were able to meet demand at
their local vaccination clinics.

Missouri’s Public Health Response to COVID-19
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•

•

Most LPHAs did not have vaccine appointment
systems that could meet the demand and be
interoperable with surveillance/reporting systems.

•

LPHAs were forced to purchase appointment
systems in the middle of an emergency, often
learning to use them as they were trying to
stand up mass vaccination efforts.
Many LPHAs lacked a full understanding of the
underlying health and social service needs of
their communities, especially those most vulnerable in the pandemic, including racial and ethnic
minorities, as well as immigrant populations. This
hampered their ability to know in advance (or in
real time) how to target outreach and services
during an emergency.

Emergency Preparedness and
Response
HealthierMO defines this capability as the “capacity
to promote ongoing community resilience and preparedness, issue and enforce public health orders, share
information with key partners and the general public, and
lead the health and medical response to emergencies.”

FINDINGS
• Past emergency response experience, planning,

and exercises were not fully leveraged during the
pandemic. We heard nearly universal agreement
among the LPHAs that the state did not activate
prior plans, in some cases hampering local response
efforts. LPHAs felt that preparation for H1N1 and
other disasters and outbreaks had been better
coordinated. Some of this could be attributed to
the loss of dedicated funding for staff preparedness
and turnover of staff who had prior emergency
experience, but that is only a partial explanation. It
should be noted that some smaller LPHAs shared
emergency planning staff, which they believe served
them well in the pandemic. This could be a model
for future preparedness capacity.

Past emergency response
experience, planning, and exercises
were not fully leveraged during the
pandemic.

• Coordination between emergency response

officials (e.g., SEMA and their local equivalents) and public health was often lacking or
disjointed. Informal channels of communication
were often used to compensate. From the LPHA
perspective, coordination at the state level across
the various emergency response structures (the
Fusion Cell, SEMA, COADS, and VOADS) was
lacking and LPHA perspectives were often missing
from decision making.

• The state uses a Highway Patrol map to define

the health regions of the state,11 which was not
useful for the pandemic response and coordination because it does not align with public health or
health care infrastructure and does not reflect population density. These pre-existing regional divisions
superimposed a structure that undermined working
relationships already created by LPHAs.

• Given the structural limitations of LPHA capac-

ity, the health care sector (primarily hospitals
and health centers) took on significant public
health functions, ranging from standing up testing
programs and doing limited contact tracing to
organizing vaccine clinics and redistribution. In
some communities, health care leaders, not LPHAs,
were looked to for public health guidance and
were viewed as the lead communicators during
the pandemic. While multiple funding streams and
diverse approaches to responding to the pandemic
can be beneficial, they require coordination and
information-sharing so that LPHAs are able to fill

11 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services divides its health reporting regions according to the Missouri State Highway
Patrol map. To view the regional map, see https://health.mo.gov/data/gis/pdf/map_ReportingRegions.pdf
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gaps in service provision. LPHAs, unlike their health
care system counterparts, are alone in having
ultimate responsibility for ensuring all community
members have equitable access to services such as
testing and vaccinations.
• Hospitals and health centers have different abil-

ities to reach diverse communities. They often
coordinated their activities, but outside of the St.
Louis City/County area, there was no preexisting
structure for this kind of coordination. As a rule,
LPHAs did not lead or coordinate these activities.
• Hospitals and health centers had independent

access to federal funding for their COVID work.
This was a benefit for communities, but there
was not a mechanism to track resources coming
into a community in order to better target LPHA
efforts. In many cases, LPHAs were not provided
with resources to shore up gaps in community
access to services.
• Few communities had formal or pre-existing

mechanisms for coordinating and communicating
across sectors affected by the pandemic beyond
public health and health care. Thus, informal or ad
hoc mechanisms were used to engage the business
community, the education sector, and social services providers — all of whom had important roles
to play in pandemic response and were needed to
support public health interventions.

• In St. Louis City and St. Louis County, new

groups, such as the Rapid Response Team
and PrepareSTL, were considered successful
interventions for adding social services and community support to surveillance and emergency
response strategies. Even with these new entities, substantial behind-the-scenes activity was
needed to advance partnership across sectors.

Accountability and Performance
Management
As cited by Healthier MO, LPHAs “use evidence-based
or promising practices, maintain an organization-wide
culture of quality improvement, and use nationally recognized resources to monitor progress toward achieving
organizational objectives.”

FINDINGS
• Accreditation12 by the national Public Health

Accreditation Board has been embraced by
some (usually larger) LPHAs and resisted by
others. Accreditation provides an opportunity
to assess the workforce and other capabilities of
LPHAs. The cost of accreditation appears to pose
a significant barrier, as does the concern that local
services may not be comprehensive enough to
meet accreditation standards. Some LPHAs viewed
the self-assessment process toward accreditation
as more valuable than the accreditation itself.

Policy Development and Support
HealthierMO defines this as the “capacity to serve as
an expert for influencing and developing policies that
support community health and are evidence-based,
grounded in law, and legally defendable.”

FINDINGS
• Confusion existed regarding who had legal

authority to make certain decisions locally and
was a central issue in the pandemic. Because
the state left many mitigation decisions for communities to decide, a patchwork of policies was
developed, ranging from mask ordinances to
school closures.

• Policymaking authority varies greatly among the

LPHAs, and most do not have dedicated staff for
developing and analyzing policies. LPHAs also

12 The two accrediting bodies that Missouri LPHAs can voluntarily pursue accreditation through are the national Public Health
Accreditation Board (PHAB) and the Missouri Institute for Community Health (MICH). For more information on PHAB, see https://
phaboard.org/what-is-public-health-department-accreditation/. For more information on MICH, see https://michweb.org/.
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lacked authority to enforce certain policies, such
as mask ordinances. Policies were, for the most
part, developed in a reactive way as new challenges emerged. In some cases, separate boards
of health could make decisions regarding public
health interventions. In other cases, county boards
made the decisions. Regardless, local health
officers faced significant political pressure and
were often undercut by elected officials. Several
interviewees even voiced concern that the current LPHA policymaking authority, which does not
always require public health expertise or background, appears to have incentivized some local
residents to run for public office for the purposes
of limiting the authority of LPHAs. Additionally,
LPHAs often felt they lacked support from the
state in educating their local leadership on the
scientific basis of public health interventions.

• LPHAs felt they were not consulted before deci-

sions were made by the state. Decisions about
key components of the pandemic response were
made by the state and presented to the LPHAs,
without prior consultation, as a fait accompli. This
was particularly the case with vaccine distribution.
Considerable confusion also occurred around the
development of the Regional Implementation
Teams (RITs), with constantly shifting expectations
of the RITs that were not communicated clearly to
the RIT leaders let alone the LPHAs dependent on
the RITs. This lack of transparency about allocation
of scarce resources led to regional resentments:
rural communities felt the state built policies that
worked for St. Louis and Kansas City but may not
have adapted well to rural areas, while some of the
larger cities thought the state was biased in providing pandemic resources to rural communities.

• Policymaking is decentralized, causing cross-ju-

risdictional confusion. Within one region there
could be conflicting policies, creating confusion for
the many people who cross county or city borders
in their daily lives. There is no mechanism for harmonizing these policies. Overlapping jurisdictional
lines created multiple layers of decision making
and multiple opportunities for contradictory policies and regulations. One city health department
can overlap with several counties, creating added
levels of bureaucracy and confusion for communication and LPHA authority. Likewise, some school
districts bounded multiple counties, resulting in
lack of clarity related to school policies.

• LPHAs did not receive any specific guidance on

many key policy issues, such as mask policies and
school attendance. When LPHAs made decisions at
the local level, many felt undermined after the fact
by the state’s actions or communications and did
not see the state as a viable resource for resolving
differences between neighboring jurisdictions.

• School policies presented particular challenges,

with LPHAs often blind-sided by school board
decisions regarding policies for reopening,
quarantining, contact tracing, and vaccination.
School board autonomy often undercut confidence in LPHA leadership.

12
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LPHAs did not receive any specific
guidance on many key policy
issues, such as mask policies and
school attendance. When LPHAs
made decisions at the local level,
many felt undermined after the
fact by the state’s actions or
communications and did not see
the state as a viable resource for
resolving differences between
neighboring jurisdictions.

Communications
HealthierMO defines this capability as the “capacity to
build trust and engage internal and external audiences
with clear, transparent, and timely sharing, receiving
and interpretation of information.” Communication was
perhaps the biggest day-to-day challenge for all public
health officials during the pandemic. Officials were operating in a highly politicized environment, which they had
never experienced before, during a public health crisis.

FINDINGS
• Many LPHAs did not see the state as a reliable

source of information at a time when there were
often conflicting messages coming from federal
officials. LPHAs looked to one another, to CDC,
and to other non-state sources for guidance in
developing their policies. When the state did communicate about COVID, the messaging was not
always consistent and LPHAs were often not given
advance notice of new guidance.

• Conflicting guidance from neighboring LPHAs

reflects the lack of a formal mechanism for sharing
messaging or communication strategies among
the LPHAs. Though many LPHAs are members
of state-based professional organizations where
informal sharing took place, this did not result in
unified messaging.

• Many LPHAs do not have trained public infor-

mation officers. As a result, they did not have the
ability to target messaging and outreach to specific
communities. Facebook was often the prime means
for communicating at the local level by smaller
LPHAs. With more staff resources, a more sophisticated social media and communications strategy
could be adopted.

• Many LPHAs did not have resources to translate

materials into other languages, which limited
their ability to engage immigrant and refugee

communities, including immigrants working in
meatpacking plants — one of the key outbreak sites
in the state.
• Lack of trust was a big issue in COVID-related

communications with the public. Interviewees
emphasized how critical the ability to mobilize
trusted messengers was for them — and these
messengers were often not government officials.
It is not clear the degree to which LPHAs had
developed the relationships with such external
communicators. That said, in some areas local community leaders did step forward — including from
the medical community and from other sectors,
such as the business and faith communities.

• In the St. Louis region, the principal public-fac-

ing messenger, especially for information about
hospital capacity and inpatient care, was the
Metropolitan St. Louis Pandemic Task Force.

Organizational Administrative
Competencies
HealthierMO states that delivering foundational public
health programs and services requires competencies in
“information technology, human resources services, legal
services, contract and procurement services, [and] financial
management,” as well as “using performance management systems, developing employees, adjusting to shifts
in culture and environment, and managing change.”

FINDINGS
• Missouri’s LPHA workforce demonstrates tre-

mendous variation in training, skills, and capacity.
A number of interviewees admitted they were not
trained and did not have the workforce capacity to
deal with an emergency of this magnitude. In an
attempt to address this deficiency, certain counties
relied on a “shared services model,” which was
already happening informally or formally in some
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regions. Given the recent resignation of several
public health administrators across the state13 and
the difficulty that some LPHAs face in recruiting
talent, particularly in rural areas of the state, workforce development will be critical to ensuring a
strong public health system for the future.
• LPHAs reported struggles in surging their work-

force during COVID. The contact tracing burden,
as well as outreach work related to testing and vaccination, was a tremendous challenge for LPHAs.
Many were quite creative — finding retirees and
volunteers in the community, for example — but
they were also forced to divert significant numbers
of their already over-extended workforce from
other public health services to the COVID response.
Several interviewees underscored that these
approaches are financially unsustainable when
the emergency has an undetermined length and
expressed grave concern at the severe reduction of
routine services that could create new public health
challenges, especially related to chronic health
conditions, substance use, maternal and child

The importance of partnerships
across sectors — especially
between public health and
health care, but also with
businesses, education, and social
services — was emphasized by
almost all interviewees.

health, and violence and injury prevention. Interviewees also discussed legal liability concerns with
using volunteers and non-government employees
for certain functions, with no clear guidance provided by the state in this regard.

Community Partnership and
Development
HealthierMO defines this capability as the “capacity
to create, convene, and sustain strategic collaborative
relationships with partners at the local, regional, and
state level.”

FINDINGS
• The importance of partnerships across sectors —

especially between public health and health care,
but also with businesses, education, and social services — was emphasized by almost all interviewees.
In some cases, these partnerships were formalized
and led by public health. In other cases, public
health participated in partnerships convened
by others (most often the health sector). Informal relationships were critical to communication,
coordination, and elevating key policy or practical
issues. However, several interviewees noted that
smaller LPHAs in particular did not always have
the staff bandwidth to participate regularly in local
coalitions or partnerships despite the perceived
importance of having public health at the table.

•

Two sectors of particular concern were education and social services. In a number of
counties, school boards were making decisions
about re-opening, quarantine, and other mitigation measures independent of or in direct
contradiction of the LPHA. In contrast, social
services organizations (housing and food

13 See: Munz, M. (2020, October 30). Health department directors across Missouri have left jobs, face threats and harassment. St.
Louis Post-Dispatch. https://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/coronavirus/health-department-directors-across-missouri-have-left-jobs-face-threats-and-harassment/article_fa61a8fb-80dc-55f0-90fa-5a226c054667.html; Patrick, R. (2021, April 4). St.
Charles County health director to leave in May. St. Louis Post-Dispatch. https://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/coronavirus/st-charles-county-health-director-to-leave-in-may/article_184688ef-1930-510d-ab9f-f859774bf64b.html; KMBC News Staff.
(2021, May 4). Dr. Rex Archer, Kansas City’s top health official, retiring on Aug. 1. KMBC News. https://www.kmbc.com/article/drrex-archer-kansas-citys-missouri-top-health-official-retiring/36332371#.
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security programs, for example) had access to
most-at-risk populations and yet did not always
have desired support from the LPHA to do
COVID-targeted work.
• The capacity of community-based organizations

to participate in partnerships and/or contribute to
the local COVID response was variable. Organizations with larger budgets had greater resources
to leverage, but this could skew representation of
certain interests or communities.

•

In all regions, the need for cross-county partnerships was understood to be important. In some
cases, there are already formal mechanisms for
sharing services and coordinating decision making.
In other cases, this is far more informal and not as
well established.

Equity
HealthierMO includes health equity and social determinants of health “as a lens through which all public health
programs and services should be provided.”

FINDINGS
• Discussions related to equity were front and

center in many of the interviews conducted in
St. Louis City and County. The dual pandemics of
longstanding racism and COVID-19, in the context
of sustained underinvestment in community health
and infrastructure, raised concerns that state and
local responses would shortchange communities of
color who were at greatest risk for poor health and
economic consequences.

• Despite affirmations from the state about pri-

oritizing equitable policies and practices (and
dedicated staff), disparities were apparent at
all stages of the pandemic, including in early
testing, data comprehensiveness and accuracy,
vaccine availability and outreach, and communications. Further, response efforts that rely on
technology to reach the community often exacerbate the preexisting digital divide.

Despite affirmations from the state
about prioritizing equitable policies
and practices (and dedicated
staff), disparities were apparent
at all stages of the pandemic,
including in early testing, data
comprehensiveness and accuracy,
vaccine availability and outreach,
and communications.

• Considerable expertise within St. Louis City

and County across health care, education,
social services, public health, and other sectors
was not adequately leveraged and integrated
at the state and local levels to create equitable
action strategies.
• Equity is not always a priority in other regions

of the state. Various explanations were offered,
ranging from the difficulty of talking about equity
because of local politics/sentiment to the belief that
the issue was not important because some counties
had very little diversity among their residents.

• Equity was often defined by race and ethnicity,

but some interviewees also identified primary
language (in areas with significant immigrant
populations) and socioeconomic status as key
factors. Similarly, the urban/rural differences
discussed earlier were sometimes presented
with an equity lens.
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II. Implications of the State’s
Governance and Funding
Structure for Public Health
Missouri’s public health system is highly decentralized
in statute and in practice. However, as highlighted by
the COVID-19 pandemic, there remain core functions
that only a state can effectively guide (and often implement). The state’s governance and financing mechanisms
contributed to difficulties and inconsistencies in the
pandemic response across Missouri. Key findings from
our interviews:

GOVERNANCE
The legal authority and the governance structures of LPHAs
are variable14, creating opportunities for some jurisdictions
while hamstringing local public health efforts in others.
In addition, some LPHAs have overlapping jurisdictions
within a county. This creates confusion and inconsistency
across the state, especially in smaller jurisdictions.

FINANCING
Public health funds from the state or federal “passthrough” dollars are not viewed as being allocated in
a predictable and consistent way. According to many
interviewees, these funding challenges have been historically problematic. Yet during the pandemic, public
health financing was considered even more deleterious;
some LPHAs were bypassed, for example, in the allocation of CARES Act funding — remaining unfunded or
tapping their own limited reserves because of jurisdictional or policy differences with their county authorities.
The appropriate flow of public health funds was a substantial concern for all LPHAs, but especially those who
were completely left out of CARES Act relief. Other
challenges mentioned:
• The state’s level of public health funding has

been among the lowest in the country for
decades.15 In 2020, Missouri had the lowest per

14 Local Public Health Agencies by Governance, Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services (2021, July 13). https://health.
mo.gov/living/lpha/pdf/ColorMapLPHA.pdf.
15 Lang, A., Warren, M., & Kulman, L. (2018). (Issue brief). A Funding Crisis for Public Health and Safety State-by-State and Federal
Public Health Funding Facts and Recommendations. Trust for America’s Health. https://www.tfah.org/report-details/a-funding-crisis-for-public-health-and-safety-state-by-state-and-federal-public-health-funding-facts-and-recommendations/
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The state’s level of public health
funding has been among the
lowest in the country for decades.

person state public health funding in the U.S.16
Missouri’s public health system is decentralized
with 115 LPHAs that operate independently from
each other, and have varying governance structures
and authority to generate revenue — for example
through property tax.17 This variation in governance, financing mechanisms, and differences in
relative wealth of communities creates an unevenness in local public health capacity across the state,
which during a pandemic, can endanger Missouri
as a whole. Some health departments worked well
with their governing bodies and received needed
financial or governmental support to respond
more quickly and comprehensively. Other LPHAs
were financially starved by their jurisdictions, with
no adequate state response to funding. Given the
magnitude of the problem and the nature of an
airborne virus, the state’s reliance on local financial
support for public health was seen by many interviewees as misguided.

• Historically, Missouri has depended dispropor-

tionately on federal funds to support public
health functions. Those funds are often categorical
in nature, i.e., tied to specific programs or services,
thus limiting the state’s (and LPHAs’) ability to
establish a public health workforce that can adequately carry out core public health functions or be
responsive to emergent needs.

16 SHADAC Analysis of Per Person State Public Health Funding, State Health Compare. (2021, July 9). SHADAC, University of
Minnesota. http://statehealthcompare.shadac.org/.
17 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Local Public Health Agencies (2021, July 9). https://health.mo.gov/living/
lpha/.
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III. Recommendations for
Strengthening the Public
Health Infrastructure in
Missouri
Fundamental to a successful response to a public health
emergency, such as a pandemic, is ensuring that every
community is served by a strong state and local public
health agency with certain foundational capabilities. In
this section, we identify actions that can be taken on a
statewide basis to improve state and local public health
systems in Missouri, as well as cross-cutting changes that
the state could support during the post-pandemic period.

PROVIDE FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR PUBLIC
HEALTH ACCREDITATION
With some of the workforce funding that is forthcoming,
the state could provide technical assistance to jurisdictions as they assess their readiness for accreditation
and identify gaps that must be addressed. The Public
Health Accreditation Board (PHAB) has a readiness
assessment tool that could be used to determine workforce and other infrastructure investments needed by
the various LPHAs. The state could create a special

fund that would help LPHAs close those gaps, either
on their own, or through a system of regional sharing.
There are models for assessing the cost of closing gaps
in foundational capabilities that could be applied to the
state and LPHAs.18,19 (It should be noted that PHAB is
revising its accreditation standards to focus more on the
foundational public health services; the assessment of
needed investments could be framed around the draft
standards set to be released this summer.) The state
should also commit to paying the fees associated with
applying for accreditation, a financial hurdle cited by
many LPHAs.

PRIORITIZE EQUITY
The state should expand funding, staff, and other supports to assist LPHAs with targeted efforts to address
equity concerns. Such efforts should include LPHA data
collection and reporting for racial, ethnic, and other
demographic populations; increased community engagement and partnership to build trusting relationships; and

18 See: Mamaril, C. B. C., Mays, G. P., Branham, D. K., Bekemeier, B., Marlowe, J., & Timsina, L. (2018). Estimating the Cost of
Providing Foundational Public Health Services. Health Services Research, 53(4), 2803–2820. https://doi.org/10.1111/14756773.12816
19 See: Singh, S. R., Leider, J. P., & Orcena, J. E. (2020). The Cost of Providing the Foundational Public Health Services in Ohio.
Journal of Public Health Management and Practice. https://doi.org/10.1097/PHH.0000000000001233
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facilitation of linkages to both health and social services.
Further, the state should increase the capacity of the
state Office of Minority Health with dedicated staff and
funding resources.

BUILD A MODERNIZED SURVEILLANCE
SYSTEM
The state should expand its capacity at the state level by
building a modernized surveillance system and providing
LPHAs (or regional coordinating bodies, as described
below) with the hardware, software, and workforce to
manage such a system. With major federal funding
available for modernizing surveillance and epidemiology functions, the state should work closely with the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to ensure
that the new system being built will be consistent with
federal standards.

CREATION OF REGIONAL COORDINATING
BODIES
The state should incentivize and support greater formal
sharing of critical staffing and service functions among
smaller LPHAs, particularly those that would otherwise
be inefficient or too costly to be supported by individual
LPHAs. Increased sharing could be achieved through
the establishment of Regional Coordinating Bodies for
all public health functions, including preparedness, that
more accurately reflect how health (public health and
health care) services are structured in a region.
A lead public health agency should be designated to
convene each coordinating unit, which should be inclusive of all the diverse sectors needed for an effective
public health response. This approach would address
some of the coordination challenges seen during the
pandemic response and would, more importantly, provide an opportunity for building competencies and
stronger community partnerships within regions — partnerships that often cross county lines in the first place.
Key elements of this proposal are outlined below by
foundational public health capability:

• Assessment and Surveillance: While each LPHA

needs a modernized data system, economies of
scale suggest that regional epidemiologists might
be the most effective way to ensure in-depth analysis of data at the LPHA and regional level. A joint
reporting system between the regional LPHAs and
the state can ensure greater coordination of data
analysis and information among all levels of public
health and its key partners. By linking this system to
the regional coordinating body that includes representatives of the health care system (e.g., hospitals
and health centers), the opportunity to harness all
relevant health information in a region is enhanced.

• Emergency Preparedness and Response:

Regional preparedness planning and coordination
staff should be supported by the state, reviving a
model developed during H1N1 that many interviewees cited as having been quite successful but
was eliminated due to lack of funding.

• Policy Development and Support: The state

should support an entity or consortium, led by a
school of public health or a public health institute,
to provide LPHAs with independent policy and
legal analyses, including creating localized “offthe-shelf” policies that could be adapted during
an emergency. This would promote harmonization
of policies across LPHAs and within regions. Few
LPHAs have the staff or resources to provide thorough analysis of policy or legal options; this action
would provide a stronger foundation for decision
making by LPHA staff and local elected leaders.

• Communication: The state should support regional

public information officer positions. Public communication was a key challenge during the pandemic.
As noted earlier, many LPHAs do not have dedicated public information officers. For efficiency and
to ensure consistency in messaging, these officers
can be hired by the regional coordinating bodies
that are created. Even larger LPHAs can benefit
from such a process since messaging needs to be
coordinated regardless of size.
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• Community Partnership Development: These

coordinating bodies should work with LPHAs to
create regional Community Health Improvement
Plans and could work toward coordinated Community Health Needs Assessments among the
non-profit hospitals in each region. This would
encourage regional understanding of community
needs and create opportunities for ongoing collaboration, not just during an emergency, which would
build greater trust across sectors.

BOLSTER THE PUBLIC HEALTH
WORKFORCE
The state should support workforce development through
new training programs; enhanced salaries for LPHA
leaders who have advanced training; and deployment
of skilled staff to serve within regions (e.g., regional
epidemiologists). Further, a centralized system for rapid
hiring of temporary workers should be organized by the
state, with mechanisms for ensuring appropriateness
of personnel, compensation, and liability protections.

ENSURE EQUITABLE PUBLIC HEALTH
FUNDING ACROSS THE STATE
Providing a minimum level of financing for LPHAs
(through state or pass-through federal dollars) could
begin to level the playing field. That minimum level
could be determined based on the financial requirements
for LPHAs and their regions to ensure delivery of all
foundational public health services. An equity analysis,
incorporating social vulnerability, is needed to determine
if different approaches to financing could create a more
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even distribution of resources to support LPHAs across
counties and cities. Perhaps most critically, public health
money should flow directly to the appropriate LPHAs
rather than through the counties. This direct flow may
require provision of technical assistance with financial
management to LPHAs or the flexibility for LPHAs to use
fiscal intermediaries, such as local community foundations or regional non-profits, which can manage funds
for them. In addition, giving LPHAs more flexibility to
braid categorical dollars (and/or provide state funds to
support key workforce capacities) would be beneficial.

CLARIFY LPHA GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
AND AUTHORITIES
While attempting to modify the authority and governance of LPHAs is currently politically fraught, the state
could commission a legal analysis, perhaps through the
Network for Public Health Law, to find ways to create
greater consistency in decision making and oversight
across LPHAs. As part of the analysis of LPHA governance, a sub-analysis is needed regarding the different
ways LPHAs finance their operations.

HARMONIZE POLICY DEVELOPMENT
Even in a decentralized system, especially during emergencies, the state should ensure that there are consistent
policies across jurisdictions regarding public health
control measures. DHSS should establish, and adhere
to, specific protocols for consultation with, and advance
notice of, new policies during emergencies.

Conclusion
The public health community in Missouri has had robust conversations
about the need for modernization, focused on foundational capabilities and
accreditation. This summary report presents key, high-level findings from
interviews and observations that reflect statewide gaps or deficiencies. It
also outlines key opportunities for policy and system changes needed at
the state level to support a stronger public health system across the state
and to incentivize modernization of LPHAs that are committed to enhancing
their foundational capabilities.
With the influx of significant new federal funds, the state has an opportunity to
both build state-level capacity in key areas as well as support and incentivize
key improvements at the local or regional level — actions the state has not
had the resources to undertake until now. Importantly, some of the federal
dollars can be spent over a multi-year period, which allows for ramping
up and sustaining public health capacity for a significant period of time.
We believe the recommendations in this report provide helpful guidance
and critical areas of focus for Missouri during the remainder of the COVID
response, the recovery period, and beyond.
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Appendix A: Methods and Data
Sources
We used a mixed-methods, qualitative comparative case
study approach to conduct an evaluation of the public
health response to COVID-19 in Missouri. The findings
in this report come principally from qualitative interviews
with stakeholders, supplemented by media accounts
and other publicly available data sources. A total of
138 one-hour interviews were conducted virtually from
August 2020 to May 2021 with 129 stakeholders from
state and local public health departments, elected and
other government officials, health care organizations,
educational institutions, the business community, faithbased organizations, membership associations, and a
variety of social support services and other non-profits
(Table 1). Because of the dynamic nature of the pandemic, nine stakeholders were interviewed twice over
the study period.
We recruited a purposeful sample of stakeholders in three
regions of the state to reflect variation in experiences
with public health practice, local governmental processes
and structures, and potential opportunities for strengthening public health statewide. The three areas were the
Northeast, Southwest, and St. Louis regions (Table 2).
We recruited additional stakeholders whose perspectives
crossed regional boundaries. We began our recruitment
strategy with video-calls with five stakeholders recommended by Missouri Foundation for Health (MFH). These
calls provided valuable information about the overarching issues experienced by local public health agencies
and hospitals. MFH also provided the GW team with a
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starter list of potential interviewees. Additional contacts
were recruited through snowball sampling, reviews of
media reports, and general research techniques. All
interviewees were promised confidentiality, and all but
the initial five interviewees remain anonymous. Interview
questions came from guides developed by GW for this
study and customized to the sector represented by the
interviewee. In the vast majority of cases, each interview
consisted of one individual stakeholder and two GW
study members.
Interviews were audio-recorded with permission and
transcribed. Alternatively, careful note-taking was used
when interviewees did not consent to audio-recording.
All of the transcripts and notes were coded using the
Dedoose qualitative software platform and following
standard protocols for building a codebook and applying the codes to transcripts. Each interview transcript
was coded by two or more GW study team members.
Coded interview excerpts were reviewed for common
themes, both within and across geographic regions.
Themes were identified based on a variety of rationales,
including the frequency with which they were mentioned
in different transcripts and regions, the emphasis with
which they were presented, and consensus amongst
different GW study team members. This report presents cross-cutting themes, except in cases where we
saw substantial regional variation in terms of findings.
A subsequent project report will provide detailed case
study findings by region.

TABLE 1: NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS BY SECTOR (AUGUST 2020 – MAY 2021)
Sector

Who is Included?

Number of Interviews

Business

Chambers of commerce, business councils, economic
groups

9

Community
Organizations

Non-profits, for-profits, health networks, community
partnerships, social services

14

Education

K-12, higher education, education-focused entities

16

Faith-based

Churches, faith-based social service organizations,
religious groups

4

Healthcare

Hospitals and health centers, health care associations,
long-term care facilities, behavioral health

36

Policy

Government entities

9

Public Health

Emergency management, LPHAs, research, other public
health-focused organizations

50

Total

138

TABLE 2: NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS BY REGION (AUGUST 2020 – MAY 2021)
Region

What Does This Include?

Number of Interviews

Northeast

A mix of counties in Highway Region B*

26

Southwest

A mix of counties in Highway Region D*

34

St. Louis

St. Louis City, St. Louis County, Jefferson County, and St.
Charles County

45

Statewide

Statewide healthcare associations, statewide coalitions,
Department of Health and Senior Services, state offices and
divisions, state initiatives, non-governmental organizations

33

Total

138

*Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services divides its health reporting regions according to the Missouri State Highway Patrol
map. To view the regional map, see https://health.mo.gov/data/gis/pdf/map_ReportingRegions.pdf
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